Resurrection of a French Heresy:
Joshua De La
Place's Denial of the
Imputation of Adam's
Sin to His Posterity
The Amyraldian Association, headed by Alan C.
Clifford in Norwich, England, is aggressively promoting the views of the
French heretic, Moise Amyraut (1595-1664). Less well known are Amyraut's
fellow professors at the Academy of Saumur, Joshua De La Place
(1596-1665) and Louis Cappel (1585-1658). Frans Pieter Van Stam, a
historian sympathetic to Amyraut, writes, "At this academy in 1631 three
relatively young theologians were appointed who together formed a
close-knit team."1 While Amyraut undermined the atonement, De
La Place subverted the doctrine of original sin and Cappel attacked the
text of Scripture.
Not content with resurrecting the views of one
French heretic, the Amyraldian Association are now promoting Joshua De
La Place's erroneous
views on original sin. In a recent publication, enthusiastically
endorsed by Clifford, David Llewellyn Jenkins sets forth De La Place's
doctrine of mediate imputation. This doctrine subverts the doctrine of
original sin and, as this paper will contend, jeopardizes the doctrine
of justification, as can be observed as a bitter fruit in the writings
of the Amyraldian Association.
II. A Brief History of
Joshua (or Josué) De La Place (or Placaeus) was
appointed theological professor at the Academy of Saumur in 1631 or
1632. He remained professor there until his death in 1665, less than a
year after the death of his close friend and colleague, Amyraut. In
1640, six years after the publication of Amyraut's
infamous Brief Traitté de la Prédestination, De La Place
published his treatise on original sin, De statu hominis lapsi ante
gratiam.2 This was followed in 1655 by De Imputatione
Primi Peccati Adami. In this latter treatise De La Place set forth
his position of mediate imputation.
De La Place's
doctrine of mediate imputation has been defined by theologians in
different ways. Jenkins defines it this way: "The belief that the sin of
Adam reached his descendants only as mediated by the inherited and
sinful state."3 James Buswell writes, "This doctrine would
imply that we are not guilty sinners because our representative sinned
but we are guilty sinners only because we ourselves are individually
corrupt."4 James Garrett defines mediate imputation as "the
theory that depravity is the medium through which the imputation of Adam's
guilt to all human beings takes place."5 Robert L. Dabney
elucidates the doctrine thus:
[De La Place] said that the imputation of Adam's
sin was only mediate, and consequent upon our participation in total
native depravity, which we derive by the great law, that like begets
like. We, being thus depraved by nature, and, so to speak, endorsing
his sin, by exhibiting the same spirit and committing similar acts,
it is just in God to implicate us in the same punishments.6
Stanley Grenz offers the most helpful explanation
expressed in a simple syllogism: "We are not guilty of Adam's
sin; rather God imputes guilt to us because of the presence of depravity
in us ... Adam sinned; therefore, all are depraved; therefore, all
are guilty."7 This stands in contrast to the orthodox
position: "Adam sinned; therefore, all are guilty."8
De La Place introduced his doctrine in the middle of
the Amyraut controversy when the French Reformed Churches were already
in turmoil over Amyraut's
hypothetical universalist view of the atonement. The National Synod of
Charenton met in 1645 and exonerated Amyraut, but it also published the
following decree in reference to a certain teaching on original sin
circulating in the French churches:
The Synod condemneth the said doctrine as far as
it restraineth the nature of Original Sin to the sole hereditary
corruption of Adam's
posterity, to the excluding of the imputation of that first sin by
which he fell, and interdicteth on pain of all Church-censures, all
pastors, professors, and others, who shall treat of this question,
to depart from the common received opinions of the Protestant
Churches, who (over and besides that corruption) have all
acknowledged the imputation of Adam's
first sin unto his posterity. And all synods and colloquies, who
shall hereafter proceed to the reception of scholars unto the holy
ministry, are obliged to see them sign and subscribe this present
Many writers consider this decree to be a
condemnation of De La Place, although he is nowhere named in the decree
as the one guilty of heterodoxy. For example, Brian Armstrong, one
sympathetic to Amyraut, writes, "This condemnation of De La Place's
views was a stunning blow to the Saumur Academy."10 Van Stam
agrees: "It is perfectly clear, however, that the Synod had in mind the
ideas of Josué De La Place, Amyraut's colleague at Saumur."11
Jenkins, De La Place's
modern advocate, however, believes that the views of De La Place were
condemned by the French Synods. He has uncovered a letter from Charles
Drelincourt (1595-1669) addressed to De La Place in 1653 in which
Drelincourt, a delegate to the Synod of Charenton and one who helped to
compose the aforementioned decree, assures De La Place that the
condemnation was not addressed against him at all: "Sir, I can well
assure you, and all those who have any doubt of it, that the intention
of the last National Synod of Charenton was in no way to condemn either
your person or the doctrine which you are putting forward." He goes on
to write that he is in full agreement with De La Place: "We have never
thought to posit the imputation of the sin of Adam which you call
antecedent and immediate, but only that which you name consequent and
mediate. And for my part, I have always thus conceived and taught it."12
Jenkins concludes, "De La Place is largely in agreement with the decree
as set out at Charenton, and certainly does not consider himself
condemned by it … It was only represented as being a denunciation
of De La Place by Garrisoles and his supporters after the event."13
John Murray includes this preface to the Synod's
decree and one is left wondering, if De La Place is not meant
here, who is? The preface reads,
There was a report made in the Synod of a certain
writing, both printed and manuscript, holding forth this doctrine,
that the whole nature of original sin consisted only in that
corruption, which is hereditary to all Adam's
posterity, and residing originally in all men, and denieth the
imputation of his first sin.14
Which writing had come to the Synod's
attention and what was Synod condemning if not De La Place's
treatise published some five years previously? Dabney contends that De
La Place knew he was condemned and invented the distinction between
mediate and immediate imputation to avoid censure: "The distinction
seems to have been a ruse designed to shelter himself from censure."15
Turretin agrees and charges De La Place with "rais[ing] a smoke" with
his artificial distinction between mediate and immediate imputation.16
If Jenkins is correct in his assertion that the Synod
did not in fact condemn De La Place it only further highlights the
weakness of the French Reformed Churches. They were unable to condemn
Amyraut and De La Place for their aberrant views of the atonement and
original sin respectively. Amyraut and De La Place were in full
agreement on this issue. Jenkins enthuses: "Not surprisingly, De La
Place's opinion in
respect of Adam's sin
was ultimately endorsed by Moise Amyraut and drawn into his own
De La Place was never condemned by name by the French
synods and neither he, Amyraut nor Cappel were ever disciplined.
Nevertheless, De La Place's
doctrine was criticized from many quarters, especially in Switzerland in
the Formula Helvetica Consensus (1675) where we read:
We hold [therefore] that the sin of Adam is
imputed by the mysterious and just judgment of God to all his
posterity. For the Apostle testifies that in Adam all sinned, by
disobedience many were made sinners (Rom.
v. 12, 19), and in Adam all die (I Cor. xv. 21, 22). But
there appears no way in which hereditary corruption could fall, as a
spiritual death, upon the whole human race by the just judgment of
God, unless some sin (delictum) of that race preceded,
incurring (inducens) the penalty (reatum, guilt) of
that death. For God, the supremely just Judge of all the earth,
punishes none but the guilty (Canon X).
For a double reason, therefore, man, because of
sin (post peccatum) is by nature, and hence from his birth,
before committing any actual sin, exposed to God's
wrath and curse; first on account of the transgression and
disobedience which he committed in the loins of Adam, and, secondly,
on account of the consequent hereditary corruption implanted in his
very conception, whereby his whole nature is depraved and
spiritually dead; so that original sin may rightly be regarded as
twofold, viz., imputed sin and inherent hereditary sin
Accordingly, we can not, without harm to Divine
truth, give assent to those who deny that Adam represented his
posterity by appointment of God, and that his sin is imputed,
therefore, immediately to his posterity; and under the term
imputation mediate and consequent not only destroy the imputation
of the first sin, but also expose the doctrine (assertio) of
hereditary corruption to great danger (Canon XII).18
The Swiss were not the only opponents of De La Place's
theory. Robert Haldane quotes the reaction of the Theological Faculty of
Leyden from November, 15, 1645:
We have learned with great pain that the
doctrine, which has been by common consent received as scriptural
respecting the imputation of Adam's
sin, is now disturbed, although when it is denied, the original
corruption of human nature cannot be just, and a transfer is easy to
a denial of the second Adam's
The theologians in Saumur held to a peculiar view of
man's depravity which
"informed De La Place's
work on Adam's sin."20
Distinguishing between a natural and a moral ability De La Place and
Amyraut taught that "man is naturally able to respond to grace because
he possesses both understanding and will, but won't
because of the corrupting effects of sin on the mind."21
This means that man "is able to understand, to reason, and to take the
decision, the rational decision, to come to faith" and "if, despite his
natural ability, man decides not to take up God's
universal offer," he only has himself to blame for the damnation which
follows.22 This is not a biblical distinction. The Bible says
"there is none that understandeth" (Rom. 3:11) and describes the ungodly
as "having the understanding darkened" (Eph. 4:18). Understanding is a
gift of God peculiar to the regenerate (I John 5:20), not a natural
doctrine, of course, fits with universal grace and a universal will of
God to save all (with another particular will of God to save some23),
but not with particular, efficacious, sovereign grace rooted in
particular, unconditional election and displayed in a particular,
III. The History of
the Dogma of Original Sin
De La Place, like Amyraut, appealed to Calvin in
support of his doctrine. In order to evaluate this claim we turn to the
history of dogma because we can only understand Calvin' s
position when we understand the theological climate in which he engaged
Pelagius (c. 354-418) denied original sin outright.
According to Pelagius, Adam sinned as an individual and his sin had no
effect on his posterity except by way of example. The Pelagians, so
Warfield explains, "utterly denied, therefore, that men either suffer
harm from Adam's sin or
profit by Christ's
merits. By their examples only, they said, can either Adam or Christ
Pelagianism was roundly condemned by the early church due especially to
the polemical labours of Augustine.
Roman Catholicism developed a Semi-Pelagian doctrine
of sin especially in the Middle Ages and it was to this doctrine that
the Reformers reacted. It was at the Council of Trent that Rome codified
her doctrine of original sin. Rome did this in response to Protestantism
which was teaching man's
total depravity. Rome, in the interest of safeguarding man's
freewill, rejected the Reformation's
doctrine of total depravity. Trent taught the following concerning
Original Sin: Adam, by his disobedience "immediately lost the holiness
and justice wherein he had been constituted"25 and "the
entire Adam through that offence of prevarication was changed, in body
and soul, for the worse."26 Furthermore, Trent anathematised
the Pelagians who "assert that the prevarication of Adam injured himself
alone and not his posterity."27 Adam transmitted to his
posterity both guilt and corruption, but "by the grace of [Christ],
which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted,"28
and furthermore concupiscence in the baptized "is not truly and properly
sin in those born again."29
Finally, Trent does not intend to include the Virgin Mary among those
tainted by original sin.30 Murray remarks,
One would gather from these statements that the
sin of Adam which is the sin of all is that which by propagation is
transfused into all. Obviously this notion is quite distinct from
that of the imputation to all of the actual transgression of Adam.31
It is important to note that Trent was responding,
not only to the Reformers but also to certain of her own theologians,
Albertus Pighius (1490-1542) and Ambrosius Catherinus (1483-1553), who
understood original sin to consist in merely the imputation of Adam's
sin, but with no consequent corruption of the nature. Writes A. A.
At the Council of Trent Albertus Pighius and
Ambrosius Catherinus … maintained that the imputed guilt of Adam's
first sin constituted the only ground of the condemnation
which rests upon men at birth. The Council did not allow this heresy
but nevertheless maintained a rather negative than positive view of
A. N. S. Lane's
introductory essay to Calvin's
polemic against Pighius confirms this:
Pighius posited a novel theory of original sin
according to which the only effects of the fall of Adam were the
introduction of death and the imputation of the guilt of Adam's
sin to all humanity. There was no talk of the corruption of human
nature as a result of the fall.33
In other words, what was at issue at the time of the
Reformation was not the imputation of Adam's
sin—both sides agreed that there was such an imputation, although a
detailed development of the doctrine had not been offered—but the
(total) corruption of man. Both man's
guilt in Adam and man's
corruption were grounds for man's
condemnation from birth, although Rome (with her doctrine of baptismal
regeneration) taught very different solutions to the problem.
Thus Charles Hodge observes,
As at the time of the Reformation an influential
party in the Romish church held, after some of the schoolmen,
that original sin consists solely in the imputation of Adam's
first sin, and as the Confessions of the
Reformers were designed not only as an exposition of the truth, but
as a protest against the errors of the church of Rome, it will be
observed that the Protestants frequently assert that original sin is
not only the imputation of Adam's
sin but also hereditary corruption of nature; and the Reformed
theologians often made the latter more prominent than the former,
because the one was admitted by their adversaries, but the other
It became not uncommon (especially after Dun
assertion of the doctrine of "immediate imputation") for the
imputation of Adam's
sin to be exploited precisely in the interest of denial or weakening
of the idea of the derivation of inherent corruption from Adam … The
Protestants … constantly remark that men's
native guilt in the sight of God rests not merely upon the
imputation to them of Adam's
first sin, but also upon the corruption which they derive from him
… The polemic turn given to these statements has been the occasion
of a remarkable misapprehension, as if it were intended to
subordinate the imputation of Adam's
transgression to the transmission of his corrupted nature as the
source of human guilt. Precisely the contrary is the fact. The
imputation of Adam's
transgression was not in dispute; all
parties to the great debate of the age fully recognized it; and it
is treated therefore as a matter of course. What was important was
to make it clear that native depravity was along with it the
ground of our guilt before God. Thus it sought to hold the
balance true, and to do justice to both elements in a complete
doctrine of original sin.35
Suffice it to say, then, that the Reformers,
including Calvin (to whom we shall return), taught that man is guilty
of Adam's sin and of
his own inherent corruption which has rendered him totally depraved and
unable to do anything good.
The modern Roman Church teaches the following on
All men are implicated in Adam's
sin … [Adam] has transmitted to us as sin with which we are all born
afflicted, a sin which is the "death of the soul" … the transmission
of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully understand … It is
a sin which will be transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that
is by the transmission of a human nature deprived of original
holiness and justice. And that is why original sin is called "sin"
only in an anagogical sense: it is a sin "contracted" and not
a state and not an act … it does not have the character of a
personal fault in any of Adam's
descendants. It is a deprivation of original holiness and justice,
but human nature has not been totally corrupted.36
We notice an absence of imputation language
("implicated" and "transmitted" are Rome's
terms) and an insistence that man is not "totally corrupted." This, of
course, fits Rome's
doctrine of justification, infused not imputed righteousness.
Arminianism and Socinianism
The Arminians and Socinians rejected the imputation
of Adam's sin to his
posterity. Grenz writes concerning Arminius that he "softened the
seemingly harsh view of Reformed theology. To do so, Arminius reasserted
the semi-Pelagian position that Adam's
offspring do not share in the guilt of the sin of our first father."37
Turretin quotes Socinus:
Although all men descending from Adam are exposed
to perpetual death it is not because the sin of Adam is imputed to
them but because they are begotten by him who was devoted to eternal
death by a divine decree. And so that happens to them not on account
of the imputation of sin but on account of the propagation of the
Also Ursinus attributes the view that "posterity are
not guilty on account of the fall of our first parents"
to Pelagianism and Anabaptism.39
The realist teaches that our human nature sinned
in Adam and we, as it were, were "in him" sinning with him. Charles
According to this theory humanity is numerically
one and the same substance in Adam and in all the individuals of his
race. The sin of Adam was, therefore, the sin of all mankind because
committed by numerically the same rational and voluntary substance
which constitutes us men. It was our sin in the same sense that it
was his sin because it was our act (the act of our reason and will)
as much as it was his.40
In other words, writes Berkouwer, guilt is an "actual
and real co-sinning" for realists "want an imputation in which we are
held responsible for what we actually do."41
The problems with realism are insurmountable. Only a
person can sin, objects Buswell.42 Hodge posits other
descendants cannot actually sin before they exist; realism cannot
explain why our human nature is not guilty of all Adam's
sins and of the sins of Eve besides.43 Buswell finds in
realism insoluble difficulties connected to the Incarnation of Christ:
"This human nature in its totality became sinful in Adam. What then is
the nature of the humanity of Christ?"44
Only if it is maintained that all human beings born
of natural generation inherit a totally depraved nature on account of
the imputed sin of Adam to them, can we understand how Christ, born
of the Virgin Birth, to whose Person no sin was imputed, could be exempt
from this general rule.
IV. The Reformed Dogma of
We observed above that the Roman Church, against
which Calvin and the other Reformers contended, downplayed man's
original corruption while confessing the imputation of Adam's
sin. The Reformed do not espouse the theory of Realism but teach
Federalism, that Adam was the legal or federal or representative head of
Federalism is the teaching that God appointed Adam to
be our representative in the Garden. The guilt of his sin is imputed or
legally reckoned to our account, although we did not actually take the
forbidden fruit with our own hands and eat it with our own mouths.
Thornwell writes, "If Adam were the agent of us all, his act was legally
and morally ours."45 Norman Geisler, although not Reformed,
is correct when he describes the situation with Adam as follows:
As our legal representative Adam sinned on our
behalf and we received the legal consequences of his choice. In
other words, Adam had the God-given power of attorney for the whole
human race, and when he exercised it for ill the consequences of his
sin were directly imputed to all of his posterity.46
Calvin's doctrine of original sin is not refined. William Cunningham
writes, "The first Reformers did not speculate very largely or minutely
upon the more abstract questions directly comprehended under the subject
of original sin."47 Berkhof concedes that "the ideas of Adam
as the representative of the human race and of the immediate imputation
of his guilt to his descendants are not clearly expressed in their
[i.e., the Reformers'] works."48 Yet he calls De La Place's
view "something new in Reformed theology."49 Bearing this in
mind we consider Calvin's teaching in his commentary on Romans and in his Institutes of
the Christian Religion.
Concerning Romans 5:12, Calvin writes against those
"who contend that we are so lost through Adam's
sin, as though we perished through no fault of our own, but only because
he had sinned for us."50 Calvin does not deny that we are
guilty for Adam's sin,
merely that that is the only ground of our guilt. We are guilty,
writes Calvin, of both Adam's
sin and our own sins. Calvin's
interpretation of the verb "sinned" (in the aorist) in Romans 5:12 is
unsatisfactory. He interprets it thus: "But to sin in this case is to
become corrupt … we have all sinned; for we are all imbued with natural
corruption and so are become sinful and wicked."51
Yet, at the same time, Calvin denies that the sin referred to is "actual
sin," "for if every one for himself contracted guilt, why did Paul form
a comparison between Adam and Christ? It follows that our innate and
hereditary depravity is what is here referred to."52
Later Calvin teaches that Adam's
imputed sin is not the only ground of our guilt and condemnation
before God: our hereditary sinful flesh is also a ground:
When he says, by the offence of one, &c.,
understand him as meaning this: that corruption has from him
descended to us: for we perish not through his fault, as though we
were blameless; but as his sin is the cause of our sin, Paul
ascribes to him our ruin: our sin I call that which is implanted in
us and with which we are born.53
Again Calvin writes, stressing the fact that not by Adam's sin alone
(imputed to us) do we die,
sin we are not condemned through imputation alone, as though
we were punished only for the sin of another; but we suffer
his punishment, because we ourselves are guilty; for as our nature
is vitiated in him, it is regarded by God as having committed sin.54
Calvin also writes on verse 19, "we are guilty
through the offence of one man in such a manner as not to be ourselves
innocent. He had said before that we are condemned; but that no one
might claim for himself innocency, he also subjoined that every one is
condemned because he is a sinner."55
Later we shall offer an exegesis of this crucial
passage but suffice it to say at this point that Calvin's
exegesis does not do justice to the aorist in verse 12, to the "one" sin
throughout the passage or to the parallel between Adam and Christ. The
editor of Calvin's
commentaries writes that Calvin "explains this in a way that is not
altogether consistent."56 Murray agrees. Calvin's
exegesis, he writes, "is exegetically speaking similar to that of Rome,"
and adds, "while Calvin's
view of original sin is thoroughly Pauline and biblical, yet,
exegetically, he has not been successful in analyzing the precise
thought of the apostle in this passage."57 Martyn Lloyd-Jones
is sharply critical of Calvin's
view. Although he offers no reference from Calvin's
works, he writes the following:
He says that all sinned means that all have
sinned in the sense that all are sinful … What about this
explanation? I am afraid that we have to say that we cannot accept
it in spite of John Calvin! We must not turn him into a pope!58
Jenkins notices this and remarks in his apology for De La Place,
Inherent within this typically forthright
appraisal is the tacit acceptance that the designation
should only be applied to that method of imputation described and
advocated by De La Place. And one can only wonder why so few that
own the name of Calvin are willing to accept the implications of Dr.
A few remarks can be made in Calvin's
defence: first, Calvin wrote this commentary in 1539 when he was just
thirty years old; and second, Calvin did not develop the doctrine of the
imputation of Adam's
sin because it was not a disputed point in his day. To try to find in
Calvin a solution to the debate "mediate" versus "immediate" imputation
is anachronistic. He never faced the issue. In his Institutes,
he does not address the issue either. He aims his polemical pen against
the Pelagians who "chatter" that "Adam's
sin was propagated by imitation. Then does Christ's
righteousness benefit us only as an example as set before us to imitate?
Who can bear such sacrilege!"60 In the Institutes,
Calvin makes little if anything of the imputation of Adam's
sin to all his posterity. Instead, Calvin concentrates on the
propagation of a sinful nature. He writes,
Adam, by sinning, not only took upon himself
misfortune and ruin but also plunged our nature into like
destruction. This was not due to the guilt of himself alone,
which would not pertain to us at all, but was because he
infected all his posterity with that corruption into which he had
It is not clear what Calvin means by that highlighted
phrase. Does he mean that the guilt of Adam's
sin does not pertain to us and that we are therefore not guilty of the
sin of Adam at all? If he does mean that, we cannot agree with Calvin on
Later in the same chapter, when discoursing on the
transmission of original sin, Calvin writes, "It had been so ordained by
God that the first man should at one and the same time have and lose,
both for himself and for his descendants, the gifts that God had
bestowed upon him."62 Again, he writes, not clearly
distinguishing between original guilt and original pollution, as later
writers have done:
For, since it is said that we became subject to
through Adam's sin,
we are to understand it not as if, we, guiltless and undeserving,
bore the guilt of his offence, but in the sense that, since we
through his transgression have become entangled in the curse, he is
said to have made us guilty. Yet, not only has punishment fallen
upon us from Adam, but a contagion imparted by him resides in
us, which justly deserves punishment.63
Does Calvin mean here that we are guilty on account
of Adam's sin in
addition to the sin which resides in our own totally depraved natures?
"Entangled in the curse" is not a precise theological description, but
whatever he means by this, does he intimate that it has made us guilty
before the "contagion" is imparted to us? In addition, Calvin writes
that infants "carry their condemnation along with them" but that "they
are not guilty of another's
fault but their own" and their nature is "rightly considered sin in God's
sight, for without guilt there would be no accusation."64
Turretin writes concerning Calvin,
He does not mention imputation whenever he speaks
of original sin, either because it had not yet been called into
controversy or because he disputed against Albert Pighius … where he
was not to labor in proving imputation (which alone the adversaries
acknowledged) but only in asserting inherent corruption.65
He then quotes Calvin in several places, where Calvin
teaches the judicial ground of our being born totally depraved is the
prior fault of Adam: "We say that God by a just judgment cursed
us in Adam and willed us to be born corrupt on account of his sin;"
"one sinned; all are led to punishment; nor is that all, but from
the sin of this one, all have contracted contagion so that they are born
corrupt;" "we are liable not only to temporal miseries but to eternal
death, also [unless because] on account of the guilt of one man
God cast us together into a common guilt."66
In his replies against certain calumnies concerning
the doctrine of providence, Calvin makes some statements which are
relevant to this discussion. For example, he writes,
On account of the fault of one man, we are all
involved in the guilt and desert of eternal death. One man sinned
and we are all dragged to punishment. And not that only, but by the
pollution of one we are all drawn into the contagion and infected
with a deadly disease … The fault of one man could have had nothing
to do with us, had not our heavenly Judge been pleased to consign us
to eternal destruction on the account!67
Unsurprisingly, then, original corruption, not
original guilt, receives the attention in the Reformed confessions
because total depravity, not the imputation of Adam's
sin, was debated at the time they were framed. Herman Hoeksema writes,
"The [Heidelberg] Catechism emphasizes the organic unity rather than the
judicial or legal solidarity of the human race. The question of original
guilt is left out of consideration and the fact of original corruption
receives all the emphasis."68 Ursinus, in his commentary on
the Heidelberg Catechism,
defines original sin in a twofold way: "Original sin is the guilt of the
whole human race on account of the fall of our first parents" and it
comprehends "exposure to eternal condemnation on account of the fall of
our first parents and a depravity of our entire nature since the fall."69
The same emphasis is found in the
Canons of Dordt. The original text of Canons III/IV:2 reads,
"Man after the fall begat children in his own likeness. A corrupt stock
produced a corrupt offspring … by the propagation of a vicious nature
by the righteous judgment of God." Those last words were omitted in
later versions. Homer Hoeksema views this as a very serious omission. He
[This is] the one place in our confessions where
the organic line is not followed exclusively in delineating the
corruption of man. Here we have at least an indication of the
judicial or legal ground of the depravity of the race; and we
consider it a rather serious mistake that this expression was
omitted in our official English version.70
Heinrich Heppe quotes Riissen and Heidegger
(respectively) as representatives of the historic Reformed position:
We teach that Adam's
actual sin is actually so imputed to all his descendants in the
ordinary way, that on this account all are deemed criminals and
either pay the penalty, or are at least considered worthy of
sin by which he ate the fruit of the forbidden tree (not the rest of
the sins committed after the fall when he no longer played the role
of a public person) is imputed to all to be sprung naturally from
Adam unto condemnation because of their connection with him; i.e.,
although Adam's sin
was not actually committed by them, it is ascribed to them, so that
because of it or in respect of it they may undergo liability and pay
the penalty or at least be held worthy of all punishments.72
V. Original Guilt and
The position of De La Place is that man is guilty
only because he is first corrupt. "In other words," states
Jenkins, "and this is the key that unlocks mediate imputation—our
natural depravity precedes our guilt."73 De La Place,
writes Jenkins, rejected "the idea that as we were all participators in
our guilt is established prior to any involvement in hereditary sin."74
Again, he writes that De La Place's
position is that "we are guilty because of our own sins, and not because
the sin of Adam is imputed to us in addition to those sins."75
Further, De La Place argues, "But if Adam's
guilt is immediately imputed then our condemnation obviously rests on
something apart from our own defects and offences: we are being
punished for something other than the iniquity of our own
The position of the immediate imputationists (the
Reformed position) is that original guilt precedes corruption. In fact,
we are born totally depraved as a punishment. Obviously, we are not born
depraved as a punishment for our depravity, but we are born
depraved as a punishment for our prior guilt in Adam. This must
be the case. God does not punish those who are guiltless. Writes H. C.
Hoeksema, "The corruption of the nature is punishment; one aspect of the
punishment of death. That punishment is on account of original guilt.
But original guilt, it must be remembered, is not propagated: it does
not rest on the organic unity of the race. It is imputed."77
To this can be added a host of witnesses. Garrett states, "Adam's
descendants are born with a depraved nature which always leads to sin
and is sinful. This depravity, however, is the effect of the imputation
and not its cause."78 Bavinck agrees: "Original pollution is
a punishment of original guilt."79 Thornwell writes, "Either
we are guilty of that act, therefore, or original corruption in us is
simply misfortune and not sin. In some way or other it is ours, justly
imputable to us, or we are not and cannot be born the children of
Why are we born with corrupt hearts? Such is more
than a terrible calamity: it is a penal infliction visited upon us
because of our prior criminality. Punishment presupposes guilt and
the punishment is given to all because all are guilty; and since God
accounts all guilty, then they must be participants in Adam's
The mediate imputationists have a problem, therefore.
How can we be born totally depraved, smitten with a nature which cannot
do anything good and thoroughly loathsome in God's
sight without any prior guilt justly imputed to us? The immediate
imputation of Adam's
sin is the "judicial cause of [man's]
commencing [his] existence in a depraved condition," writes Hodge.82
But what explanation can the followers of De La Place offer? Writes
Dabney, "Either man was tried and fell in Adam or he has been condemned
without a trial. He is either under the curse (as it rests on him from
the beginning of his existence) for Adam's
guilt or for no guilt at all."83 Pink sets forth the
Which appears to be more consonant to human
conceptions of justice—that we should suffer through Adam because we
were legally connected with him and he transacted in our name; or
that we should suffer solely because we derive our nature from him
by generation, though we had no part in or connection with his sin?
In the former we can perceive the ground on which his guilt is
charged to our account; but in the latter we can discover no ground
or cause that any share of the fatal effects of Adam's
sin should be visited upon us. The latter alternative means that we
are depraved and wretched without any sufficient reason, and in such
an event our present condition is but a misfortune and in no wise
criminal. Nor is God to be blamed. He made man upright, but man
De La Place and his modern followers respond that it
is not fair that Adam should be our legal head without our "consent."
"In the opinion of the Federalist," complains Jenkins, "Adam is
representative by sovereign appointment. As such, his sin is directly
and legally laid at the door of all his posterity."85
work the note is sounded: but we did not consent to Adam as our
representative! A few quotations demonstrate this: Federalism
"assumes—without a scrap of biblical evidence—that mankind sanctioned
Adam's appointment as
its covenantal representative: or, as De La Place would have it,
‘Who of us ever appointed Adam to be his Deputy
or Commander?'" 86
"If the guilt of one man should implicate an entire community, that
would be because the whole community is supposed to have consented to
the guilt: otherwise it is not able to happen justly."87
The "notion that mankind agreed to appoint Adam as its covenantal
representative in the first place" is according to Jenkins
De La Place reiterates that "Adam was never offered or was in a position
to accept this representative role."89
In response to De La Place and Jenkins, we insist
that God sovereignly appointed Adam as both the organic and the
legal head of the human race. God did not ask Adam if he would like to
have such a position: He created Adam that way in His own good pleasure.
Hoeksema writes, "If one seeks the reason for this legal solidarity of
the race ultimately that reason is to be found in the sovereign good
pleasure of God."90 Gresham Machen writes, "Adam was the
representative of all mankind by the appointment of God. We cannot
fathom the divine counsels sufficiently to say exactly why God made such
an appointment but we can see that there was something very fitting
about it."91 Murray dismisses the argument from consent as
"purely gratuitous" and argues that it is "not valid to insist that
vicarious sin can be imputed only when there is voluntary
engagement to undertake such imputation."92 Turretin writes,
"It is not necessary in order to be a just imputation that he who bears
the punishment of another's sin should either actually consent to it or
sometime have consented to it."93
This representation was fair. We could not have asked
for better representation in Eden than Adam, fresh from the hand of God,
created in God's image
with true knowledge of God, righteousness and holiness. There was no
reason why Adam should not have stood and we in him. Adam was "capable
in all things to will agreeably to the will of God" (Belgic
Confession 14). The heart of Adam was "upright" and "all his
affections [were] pure and the whole man was holy" (Canons of Dordt
III/IV:1). Pink silences the cavils of recalcitrant men:
Fresh from the hands of his Creator, with no
sinful heredity behind and no depraved nature within him, but
instead endowed with holiness and indwelt by the Spirit of God, Adam
was well equipped for the honorable position assigned him. His
fitness to serve as our head, and the ideal circumstances under
which the decisive test was made, must forever close every honest
mouth from objecting against the divine arrangement and the fearful
consequences which Adam's failure has brought down upon us.94
VI. An Exegetical Study of
The locus classicus of original sin is
undoubtedly Romans, chapter five. Berkouwer expresses its importance in
these words: "With no trace of exaggeration at all, we can say that the
entire history of the original sin dogma is decisively defined by the
question of what is meant by these words in Romans 5:12b."95
A careful exegesis of this passage shows that De La Place's view is
"All sinned," not "all are sinful"
First, we must notice the use of the aorist in verse
12: "For that all [have] sinned." In Greek the aorist is used to
describe "snapshot" actions in history. Martyn Lloyd-Jones explains it
this way: "The Apostle used here the aorist tense, which conveys the
idea of an act completed once and forever in history, an historical
event or fact, not a description of a general state."96 The
Apostle is teaching here that we are all condemned to die (death passed
upon all men) because we all sinned. The ground of our condemnation is
not first of all our actual sins, because even infants die, who have
committed no personal sins. Rather, the ground of our condemnation is
our sin in Adam, or Adam's
sin as our representative. The teaching of
mediate imputation is that we are all condemned to die because we are
all sinful. However, Paul does not write, "For that all are sinful,"
but "for that all have sinned." Herman Hoeksema makes a similar point:
"When the apostle says, ‘Death
passed upon all men for that all have sinned,'
he does not mean that all repeat the sin of Adam."97
Lloyd-Jones explains, "We inherit, of course, a sinful nature from Adam;
there is no question about that. But that is not what condemns us. What
condemns us and makes us subject to death is the fact that we have all
sinned in Adam and that we are all held guilty of sin."98
The "One" Offence of "One" Man
Second, we notice the insistence of the Apostle upon
"one offence" by "one man" as the ground of our condemnation. Paul
underlines this fact throughout the passage: "by one man sin entered
(5:12), "through the offence of one many be dead" (5:15), "one that
sinned" (5:16), "by one man's
offence death reigned by one" (5:17), "by the offence of one" (5:18) and
"by one man's
disobedience many were made sinners" (5:19). The one man is Adam. The
emphasis is on what Adam did as the representative head of the
human race. If the ground of our condemnation is not the one imputed sin
of Adam but our own depraved nature the apostle would never have used
the word "one." Our depraved nature is not "one" sin but many sins. Our
fallen nature is a cesspool of iniquity. As Calvin puts it in the
The mind of man has been so completely estranged
righteousness that it conceives, desires and undertakes only that
which is impious, perverted, foul, impure and infamous. The heart is
so steeped in the poison of sin that it can breathe out nothing but
a loathsome stench.99
Anthony Hoekema contends,
There is no indication in the key passage on
which the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's
guilt is based (Rom. 5:12-21) that the imputation of the guilt of
Adam's sin is
mediated through our corruption. In verses 16 and 18 Paul clearly
states that condemnation came upon us because of the one trespass of
Adam; so to say that that condemnation was grounded upon the sinful
depravity in which we were born is to introduce an element into the
text that is not there.100
Many "Made" Sinners
Verse 19 declares that by one man's
disobedience many were "made" sinners. The language is legal. The verb
"to make" in the text does not mean "to cause to become," but "to
constitute." Lloyd-Jones explains the meaning this way: "The word
is much stronger than our English word suggests. It means
‘to set down in the rank of'
or ‘to place in the
category of' or
‘to appoint to a particular class.'"101
He adds, "I must say again that Paul does not say that we were
We quote again from Lloyd-Jones: "Paul does not say that the one sin of
Adam has the effect of leading us to follow Adam's
example and sin ourselves, and thereby bring ourselves under
condemnation."103 "Neither does he say that as a result of
that one sin of Adam we have all inherited from Adam a sinful nature and
because of this God condemns us."104
"What the apostle is saying is that because of that one sin of Adam the
whole of mankind are treated as sinners."105
The Greek word for "made" (kathistemi) never
signifies to effect any change in a person or thing but means "to
ordain, appoint," to "constitute" legally or officially … Note well
that it is not here said that Adam's
disobedience makes us unholy. Paul goes farther back and explains
why such should follow, namely, because we are first constituted
sinners by imputation.106
John Gill explains,
Nor is the sense of the phrase, "made sinners by
disobedience" that Adam's
posterity derive a corrupt nature from him, through his sin; this is
indeed a truth, but not the truth of this passage … There is a
difference between being "made" sinners and "becoming" sinful, the
one respects the guilt, the other the pollution of nature: the one
is previous to the other and the foundation of it; men receive a
corrupt nature from their immediate parents, but they are not made
sinners by any act or acts of their disobedience.107
Robert Haldane writes,
It is essential to observe that when it is here
said that by one man's
disobedience many were made sinners there is no reference to the
commission of sin, or to our proneness to it from our innate
corruption. The reference is exclusively to its guilt … Paul
does not mean that through the disobedience of one many were
rendered depraved and addicted to the commission of sin, but that
they became guilty of sin … the term sinners has no reference to the
pollution, indwelling or actual commission of sin, or the
transmission of a corrupt nature.108
This is an important distinction. De La Place
minimizes Adam's legal
headship but Paul's
language throughout Romans, exactly because he treats the imputation of
Adam's sin on the one
hand and the imputation of Christ's
righteousness on the other hand, is legal. De La Place, writes Jenkins,
"is unyielding in his determination to look beyond our legal status" and
differs from those whose concern is "always to accentuate our legal
relationship to Adam, not our natural relationship."109
In that case, De La Place militates against the Apostle, who emphasizes
our legal relationship to Adam and to Christ. Adam is both our
natural or organic head and our legal or representative head. In
Romans 5, however, the legal headship of Adam, not the organic
relationship, is on the foreground.
Adam: the "Figure" of Him to Come
The word translated "figure" in Romans 5:14 is
"type." Pink exclaims at the incongruity of this word to describe the
relationship between Adam and Christ: in many ways Adam and Christ are
That is truly an astonishing statement. Occurring
in such a setting it is really startling and should at once arrest
our attention. With what accuracy and propriety could it be said
that the father of our fallen race foreshadowed the Lord Jesus?
Adam, when tempted, yielded and was overcome; Christ, when tempted,
resisted and overcame. The former was cursed by God, the latter was
owned by Him as the One in whom He was well pleased. The one is the
source of sin and corruption to all his posterity, but the other is
a fount of holiness to all His people. By Adam came condemnation, by
Christ comes salvation. Thus they are as far apart as the poles.
Wherein, then, was Adam a "figure" of the coming Redeemer?110
That Adam was a type of Christ means that in a
certain unique sense Adam was like Jesus Christ. To understand Romans 5
we must identify exactly in what that likeness consists. Adam and Christ
are both heads of their respective peoples: Adam of the entire human
race, and Christ of His elect church. But, although it is true that Adam
is the organic head of the human race, the same is not true of Christ.
There is only one way in which Adam's
headship typifies Christ's.
Both are legal, federal or representative heads. Again we see that De La
Place's downplaying of
Adam's federal headship
leads him away from the true meaning of Romans 5. Pink explains the type
The whole context makes it clear that it was in
the official position which he occupied that Adam was a type of the
Lord Jesus—as the federal head and legal representative of others.
If Romans 5:12-19 be read attentively it will be seen that through
it the fact which is there given the greatest prominence is that of
one acting on behalf of the many, the one affecting the destiny of
the many. What the one did is made the legal ground of what befalls
Herman Hoeksema writes, "Adam was a figure of Christ.
Both were the legal representative heads of a corporate body. In that
sense, Adam was a figure of Christ."112 Haldane concurs,
The resemblance on account of which Adam is
regarded as the type of Christ consists in this, that Adam
communicated to those whom he represented what belonged to him and
that Christ also communicated to those whom He represents what
belonged to Him.113
Remember the theme and purpose of the book of Romans. Paul is setting
forth the great doctrine of justification by the imputed righteousness
of Jesus Christ received by faith alone. This explains why in the middle
of chapter five Paul broaches the topic of the fall of Adam, several
chapters after he has explained at length the total depravity of man.
How does Romans 5 help elucidate the truth of gracious justification
Paul is expounding in the Epistle? Pink explains,
Here he shows Adam was a "figure" of Christ
(5:14), that the one sustained an analogous relation to his race as
the other did to His seed, that each transacted as the one for the
many, and that therefore the gospel principle of imputation (Christ's
righteousness reckoned to the account of the believer) is no
novelty, but identical with the one on which God acted from the
As … even so
It is vitally important for a correct understanding
of Romans 5 to see not only the typology but the exact parallel drawn
between Adam and Christ. Repeatedly, the inspired apostle employs
phrases like "as by one man" (5:12), "as by the offence of one" (5:18),
"even so by the righteousness of one" (5:18); "as by one man's
disobedience" (5:19), "so by the obedience of one" (5:19); "as sin hath
reigned unto death" (5:21) and "even so might grace reign" (5:21). If we
misinterpret the means through which we become guilty Adam's
sin, we will also be liable to misinterpret the means through which we
become righteous in Christ. The imputation of Adam's
sin and the imputation of Christ's
righteousness are closely connected in this part of Scripture.
Many theologians rightly stress the importance of a
right interpretation of this parallel. Lloyd-Jones sums up the teaching
of the entire chapter thus:
Here is the parallel. On the one hand Adam's
sin is imputed to us; on the other, Christ's
righteousness is imputed to us. But you must maintain the parallel.115
As we were constituted sinners because of Adam's
one sin and apart from any action on our part, so we are constituted
righteous persons entirely and only because of Christ's
That "all have sinned" cannot signify all their
own personal transgressions is clear because the manifest design of
Romans 5:12 is to show that Adam's
sin is the cause of death; because physical death (a part of sin's
wages) is far more extensive than personal transgression
as appears from so many dying in infancy –
and because such an interpretation would destroy the analogy between
Adam and the One of whom he was a "figure" and would lead unto this
comparison: as men die because they sin personally, so all earn
eternal life because they are personally righteous! Equally evident
is it that "all have sinned" cannot mean that death comes upon all
men because they are depraved, for this too would clash with the
scope of the whole passage. If our subjective sinfulness be the
ground of our condemnation, then our subjective holiness (and not
Christ's merits) is
the ground of our justification. It would also contradict the
emphatic assertion of verse 18: "By the offence of one judgment come
upon all men to condemnation." Thus we are obliged to understand the
"all have sinned" of verse 12 as meaning all sinned in Adam.117
Charles Hodge informs us that this is the consensus
By all theologians, Reformed and Lutheran, it is
admitted, that in the imputation of Adam's
sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of Christ's
righteousness to believers, the nature of the imputation is the
same, so that the one case illustrates the others.118
The parallel is destroyed, the doctrine and
argument of the apostle are overturned, if it be denied that the sin
of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own is the
ground of our condemnation.119
Turretin concurs: "In Christ we are constituted
righteous by the imputation of Christ's
righteousness; therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation
of his sin; otherwise the comparison is destroyed."120
Here, then, these two doctrines of the imputation
of sin and of righteousness, which is taught throughout the whole of
the Scripture, is exhibited in a manner so clear, that, without
opposing the obvious meaning of the words, they cannot be contested.
It is impossible to conceive how men could be made sinners by the
disobedience of Adam or righteous by the obedience of Jesus Christ
in any degree whatever if the truth of the doctrine of the
imputation of the sin of the former and the righteousness of the
latter be not admitted.121
We have noted the important parallel between Adam and
Christ in Romans 5. Now we examine what we argued in the introduction,
that De La Place's
position jeopardizes the doctrine of justification by faith alone.
De La Place and Amyraut were heavily influenced by
John Cameron who rejected that justification includes "the imputation of
Christ's active obedience."122 Cameron rejected the "by then
standard interpretation of justification" because "the imputation of
may seem to leave no condition left for the people to fulfill their side
of the covenant."123 Further, Cameron taught that the
"universal" covenant of grace, in the service of which Amyraut developed
his heresy of a hypothetically universalistic atonement and De La Place
his heresy of the mediate imputation of Adam's
sin, offers sufficient grace for all men's
salvation "through natural revelation" on the condition of faith.124
The theologians at Saumur taught "a twofold will of God and a universal
provision of grace for all mankind: Christ's
dying love is available to and applicable to all."125
According to Joshua De La Place, writes Jenkins, the gospel frees us
from two accusations:
First it is objected that we are sinners: that
is, guilty of violating the condition which was imposed in the legal
covenant. Next it is objected that we are unbelievers, that is, we
did not perform the condition of the covenant of grace, viz. faith.
From the former accusation we are justified by faith only, whereby
we embrace Christ's
grace and righteousness. From the latter we are justified also by
works as faith is shewed by them.126
So, we are justified by faith and works!
The "righteousness" which the believer embraces,
according to this scheme, does not include the active obedience of
Christ. The works to which De La Place refers are:
An unconscious overflow of faith that saves:
works that deplore self-advancing purpose and bespeak an endless
struggle against sin. But why struggle at all if His [Christ's]
active obedience is ours?127
It is not surprising to find De La Place and his
modern followers denying that the active obedience of Christ is imputed
to the believer in justification. By confusing the parallel between Adam
and Christ in Romans 5, they have opened themselves up to that position.
Turretin observed in his day,
There is no one of the heretics who have denied
the imputation of sin who have not for the same reason opposed the
imputation of Christ's
righteousness (as is seen in the Pelagians, Socinians and
Arminians). Hence the reasons by which the imputation of Adam's
sin is opposed can no less be turned back against the imputation of
righteousness; those upon which the imputation of Christ's
righteousness is built also serve to establish the imputation of
This denial of the active obedience of Christ is a
pet theory of the Federal Vision. No wonder, then, that we find Jenkins
quoting Norman Shepherd with approval.129 The justification
of the Federal Vision, the "single imputation view," is only
half-justification and therefore no justification at all. As a sinner
under the law of God there are two requirements I must fulfill: I must
pay the penalty for transgressing the law; and I must render perfect
obedience to the law of God. Christ graciously took upon Himself both of
these obligations: He paid the penalty for my sins and He fulfilled the
demands of the law of God for obedience in my place. If Christ's
active obedience is not imputed to me as part of my justification the
demands of the law have not been satisfied and I cannot be saved.
contention that "it is Christ's
suffering and death on the cross that is imputed to us, not His
perpetual obedience to God's
law" is a grievous error.130 In an effort to commend the
single imputation view Jenkins scorns double imputation. He accuses the
orthodox of concluding that "Christ's
death was not sufficient for our justification" and charges the orthodox
with a "reluctance to recognize the perfection of Christ's
sacrifice,"131 while the "Academy at Saumur was [so]
scrupulous in its refusal to compromise the passive obedience of
In an article entitled "Justification: the
Calvin-Saumur Perspective," Alan Clifford, the leader of the Amyraldian
Association in Great Britain, is bold to assert that this was also
"Concerning imputation, Amyraut—again like Calvin—taught only the
imputation of Christ's
passive obedience."133 Christ's
obedience to the law of God—His thirty three years of perfect submission
to God—is "for imitation rather than imputation."134 Clifford
even claims that the Heidelberg Catechism originally taught the
single imputation position but was changed between the first and second
printings "without the authors'
consent."135 Quoting Ursinus' commentary ("Evangelical justification is … the imputation and
application of that righteousness which Christ wrought for us by His
death on the cross and by His resurrection from the dead"136),
Clifford concludes that Ursinus taught only the single imputation
view of justification.137 However, a page earlier Ursinus is
clear that Christ's
active obedience must be included: "Evangelical righteousness is the
fulfilling of the law, performed not by us, but by another in our
stead, and imputed unto us of God by faith."138 That
righteousness, writes Ursinus, includes:
The entire humiliation of Christ, from the moment
of His conception to His glorification, including His assumption of
humanity, his subjection to the law, his poverty, reproach,
weakness, sufferings, death … is all included in the satisfaction
which He made for us and in the righteousness which God graciously
imputes to us and all believers. This satisfaction is equivalent to
the fulfilling of the law, or to the endurance of eternal punishment
for sin, to one or to the other of which the law binds all.139
Clifford also attempts to prove that Olevianus, the
co-author of the Heidelberg Catechism, taught the single
imputation view. He does this without success because Olevianus writes,
"[Christ] performed such obedience for us His whole life long,
and from the moment of His conception until the last drop of His blood
was spilled, He bore the wrath of God for us who believe and trust in
claim that Calvin denied the imputation of Christ's
active obedience is ably refuted by Turretin who quotes Calvin as
Elsewhere he [i.e., Paul] extends the cause of
pardon, which delivers us from the curse of the law, to the whole
life of Christ … From the time [Christ] took upon Himself the form
of a servant He began to pay the price of liberation in order to
redeem us. Nevertheless, that the Scripture may define more
precisely the mode of salvation, it ascribes this as peculiar and
proper to the death of Christ … Nor yet … is the remaining part of
His obedience which He performed during His life excluded as Paul
comprehends the whole from the beginning even to the end of His
Justification, as the authors of the Heidelberg
Catechism and Calvin taught, is the imputation of both Christ's
active and passive obedience. Christ thus satisfies the double demand of
the law against the elect sinner.
Mediate imputation must be rejected because (1) it is
a dangerous undermining of the truth of our original guilt in Adam and,
hence, justification in Christ; (2) it is not the historic Reformed
position but a novelty invented to save De La Place from ecclesiastical
censure; and (3) it is exegetically untenable. Let Reformed believers
beware of the strange winds of doctrine still blowing from the Academy
Pieter van Stam, The Controversy over the Theology of Saumur,
1635-1650, Disrupting Debates Among the Huguenots in Complicated
Circumstances (Amsterdam and Maarssen: APA-Holland University Press,
1988), p. 16.
2 David Llewellyn Jenkins,
Saumur Redux: Josué De La Place and the Question of Adam's
Sin (Harleston, Norfolk, England: Leaping Cat Press, 2008), pp. 11-12.
Saumur Redux, p. 27.
4 James Oliver Buswell, A
Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, repr. 1975), p. 298.
5 James Leo Garrett,
Systematic Theology, Biblical, Historical and Evangelical, vol. 1
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, repr. 1996), p. 488.
L. Dabney, Lectures in Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, repr. 1972), p. 340.
J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2000), p. 201; italics mine.
Theology, p. 201.
9 Quoted in Brian G.
Armstrong, Calvin and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism
and Humanism in Seventeenth Century France (Madison, Milwaukee, and
London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 104-105.
Amyraut Heresy, p. 105.
11 Van Stam, Controversy,
Saumur Redux, pp. 14-15.
Saumur Redux, p. 15; italics Jenkins'.
14 John Murray, The
Imputation of Adam's
Sin (Philipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1959), pp. 42-43.
Lectures, p. 340.
16 Francis Turretin,
Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 1 (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1992), p. 615.
Saumur Redux, p. 14.
18 Quoted in A. A. Hodge,
Outlines in Theology (London, England: Banner, repr. 1972), pp.
658-659; italics Hodge's.
19 Robert Haldane, An
Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans (McClean, VA: MacDonald
Publishing Company, 1958), p. 232.
Saumur Redux, p. 22.
Saumur Redux, p. 22.
Saumur Redux, p. 22.
Saumur Redux, p. 21.
24 B. B. Warfield,
Biblical and Theological Studies (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and
Reformed, 1952), p. 264.
25 Philip Schaff, The
Creeds of Christendom, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, repr.
2007), p. 84.
Creeds, vol. 2, p. 85.
Creeds, vol. 2, p. 85.
Creeds, vol. 2, p. 87.
Creeds, vol. 2, p. 88.
Creeds, vol. 2, p. 80.
Imputation, pp. 13-14.
Outlines, p. 357; italics mine.
33 John Calvin, The
Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defense of the Orthodox Doctrine
of Human Choice Against Pighius, ed. A. N. S. Lane, trans. G.
I. Davies (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996), p. xvii.
34 Charles Hodge,
Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers
[4th printing], 2008), p. 194; italics mine.
Biblical and Theological Studies, pp. 264-265.
36 Catechism of the
Catholic Church (Allen, TX: Thomas More of Tabor Publishing, 1994),
paragraphs 402-405, pp. 101-102.
Theology, p. 200.
Institutes, vol. 1, p. 614.
39 Zacharias Ursinus,
Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism (Philipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed, repr. 1852), p. 39.
Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p. 221.
41 G. C. Berkouwer,
Studies in Dogmatics: Sin (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), pp.
Systematic Theology, p. 303.
Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p. 224.
Systematic Theology, p. 303.
45 James Henley Thornwell,
Collected Writings, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, Scotland: Banner, 1974), p.
46 Norman Geisler,
Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2004),
p. 124. Geisler is an Arminian and in fact teaches the error that
Christ, the Second Adam "revoked what Adam did, making every human being
legally and potentially savable" (p. 125).
47 William Cunningham,
Historical Theology, vol. 1 (London, England: Banner, repr.
1969), p. 500.
48 Louis Berkhof,
Systematic Theology (Edinburgh, Scotland: Banner, repr.
2003), p. 238.
Systematic Theology, p. 239.
50 John Calvin,
Commentary on Romans (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1959), p. 200.
Romans, pp. 200-201.
Romans, p. 201.
Romans, p. 207.
Romans, p. 210; italics mine.
Romans, p. 212.
Romans, p. 202.
Imputation, p. 18.
58 Martyn Lloyd-Jones,
Romans: An Exposition of Chapter Five: Assurance (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, repr. 1977), p. 205.
Saumur Redux, p. 28.
60 John Calvin,
Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans.
Ford Lewis Battles. (USA & GB: The Westminster Press and S. C. M. Press,
1960), 2.1.6, p. 248.
Institutes, 2I.1.6, p. 249; italics mine.
Institutes, 2.1.7, p. 250.
Institutes, 2.1.8, p. 251; italics mine.
Institutes, 2.1.8, p. 251.
Institutes, vol. 1, p. 627.
Institutes, vol. 1, p. 627; italics mine.
67 John Calvin, Calvin's
Rapids, MI: RFPA, 1979), p. 269.
Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, p. 39.
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007), p.
Reformed Dogmatics, p. 333.
Saumur Redux, p. 27; italics Jenkins'.
Saumur Redux, p. 29.
Saumur Redux, p. 34; italics Jenkins'.
Saumur Redux, p. 45; italics Jenkins'.
Voice, p. 445.
Systematic Theology, vol. 1, p. 488.
79 Herman Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003),
Collected Writings, vol. 1, p. 343.
81 Pink, The
Doctrine of Human Depravity, pp. 49-50.
Outlines, p. 359.
Lectures, p. 331.
84 Arthur W. Pink, The
Doctrine of Human Depravity (Lafayette, IN: Sovereign Grace
Publishers Inc., 2001), p. 84.
Saumur Redux, p. 26.
Saumur Redux, p. 29.
Saumur Redux, p. 34.
Saumur Redux, p. 48.
Saumur Redux, p. 56.
Voice, p. 446.
91 J. Gresham Machen, The
Christian View of Man (Edinburgh, Scotland: Banner, repr. 1984), p.
Imputation, p. 36.
Institutes, vol. I, p. 616.
94 Arthur W. Pink, The
Doctrine of Human Depravity (Lafayette, IN: Sovereign Grace
Publishers Inc., 2001), pp. 44-45.
Sin, p. 491.
Romans 5, p. 199.
Romans 5, p. 210.
Institutes, 2.5.19, p. 340.
100 Anthony A.
Hoekema, Created in God's
Image (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, repr. 1994), p. 157.
Romans 5, p. 271.
Romans 5, p. 209.
Romans 5, p. 255.
Romans 5, p. 255.
Romans 5, p. 270; italics mine.
106 Pink, The
Doctrine of Human Depravity, pp. 56-57.
107 John Gill, A Complete
Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity or a System of Evangelical
Truths Deduced from the Sacred Scriptures (Paris, AK: The Baptist
Standard Bearer, Inc., repr. 1995), p. 327.
Romans, pp. 220-221; italics mine.
Saumur Redux, p. 33.
110 Arthur W.
Pink, The Doctrine of Human Depravity, pp. 38-39.
111 Arthur W. Pink, The
Doctrine of Human Depravity, pp. 39.
Righteous, p. 230.
Romans, p. 212.
114 Arthur W. Pink, The
Doctrine of Human Depravity, pp. 47-48;
Romans 5, p. 210.
Romans 5, p. 276.
117 Arthur W. Pink, The
Doctrine of Human Depravity, p. 50.
Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p. 194.
Systematic Theology, vol. 2, pp. 212-213.
Institutes, vol. 1, p. 618.
Romans, p. 220.
Saumur Redux, p. 51.
Saumur Redux, pp. 51-52.
Saumur Redux, p. 52.
Saumur Redux, p. 21.
Saumur Redux, p. 52.
Saumur Redux, p. 52.
Institutes, vol. 1, p. 623.
Saumur Redux, p. 52.
Saumur Redux, p. 53.
Saumur Redux, pp. 53, 54.
Saumur Redux, p. 53.
133 Alan C. Clifford,
"Justification: the Calvin-Saumur Perspective" (available on-line at
p. 8; quoted with approval by Jenkins, Saumer Redux, pp. 53-55.
"Justification: the Calvin-Saumur Perspective," pp. 8, 22.
"Justification: the Calvin-Saumur Perspective," p. 17.
Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, p. 326; italics mine.
"Justification: the Calvin-Saumur Perspective," pp. 17-18.
Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, p. 325; italics mine.
Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, p. 327.
Olevianus, A Firm Foundation: An Aid to Interpreting the Heidelberg
Catechism, trans. & ed. by Lyle D. Bierma (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker,
1995), p. 124; italics mine.
Institutes, vol. 2, p. 454.